Monitoring to Reduce Agency Costs: Examining the Behavior of Independent and Non-Independent Boards by Anand, Anita et al.
  
809
Monitoring to Reduce Agency Costs: Examining the 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Berle and Means’s analysis of the corporation—in particular, their 
view that those in control are not the owners of the corporation—raises 
questions about actions that corporations take to counter concerns re-
garding management’s influence.  What mechanisms, if any, do corpora-
tions implement to balance the distribution of power in the corporation?  
To address this question, we analyze boards of directors’ propensity to 
voluntarily adopt recommended corporate governance practices.  Be-
cause board independence is one way to enhance shareholders’ ability to 
monitor management, we probe whether firms with independent boards 
of directors (which we define as boards with either an independent chair 
or a majority of independent directors) are more likely than firms without 
independent boards to adopt these practices.  We focus on boards’ wil-
lingness to monitor their firms’ agents, examining the relationship be-
tween board independence and the voluntary adoption of corporate go-
vernance guidelines. 
This study relies on a novel, hand-collected dataset drawn from in-
formation circulars for approximately 1200 firms listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX) and contained in the TSX/S&P index during the 
years 1999 to 2003.  We collected information on firms’ corporate go-
vernance practices, on board composition, and on the ownership struc-
ture of the firms’ shareholdings.  Although widely held firms are predo-
minant in the United States, Canada and many other countries have rela-
                                                            
† Anita Anand is an Associate Professor at the University of Toronto; Frank Milne is a Professor at 
Queen’s University; and Lynnette Purda is an Associate Professor at Queen’s University.  This paper 
was presented at the 2008 annual meeting of the Canadian Law and Economics Association, the 
National Centre for Business Law, the University of Ontario Institute of Technology, the University 
of Toronto Law and Economics Discussion group, and the Bank of Canada.  We thank participants 
for their comments during these sessions.  Funding for this project was provided by the Social 
Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.  Thanks to Bekhzod Abdurazzakov and Tina 
Yang for their helpful research assistance. 
810 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
tively large proportions of family-owned and majority-controlled firms.1  
As a result, we controlled for the presence of large shareholders and 
identified whether they are executive, family, or institutional investors.  
Other control variables include firm financial characteristics, year of ob-
servation, and whether the firm’s stock is cross-listed on a U.S. ex-
change. 
Canada provides the ideal environment for undertaking this inquiry 
because Canadian law has historically made corporate governance the 
responsibility of the board of directors.  Until 2004, Canada relied solely 
on a best practices approach to governance in which the TSE set forth 
recommendations but did not require that firms implement those practic-
es; TSE required only that firms disclose those practices.  The voluntary 
nature of the Canadian governance guidelines and the responsibility of 
the board to respond to these guidelines allow us to examine two things: 
first, the extent to which boards vary in their propensity to arm them-
selves with additional governance tools, and second, whether this varia-
tion systematically relates to board independence.  As such, the study 
contributes to the literature on board behavior and provides valuable in-
sights for regulators on both the effectiveness of voluntary guidelines and 
the influence of independent boards. 
We show that both independent and non-independent boards volun-
tarily adopt corporate governance practices designed to enhance their 
monitoring capabilities.  Voluntary adoption of monitoring mechanisms 
across all firms has increased in recent years and it seems that board be-
havior is similar regardless of whether the board is independent or non-
independent.  However, independent boards place special emphasis on 
monitoring management through the presence of independent commit-
tees.  Historically, independent boards have been far more likely to have 
independent audit and compensation committees.  While more non-
independent boards have begun to maintain independent audit commit-
tees, the difference when compared to their independent peers remains 
significant, and compensation committees have offered little improve-
ment.  An independent board’s ability to adopt additional mechanisms 
beyond independent committees is heavily influenced by the presence of 
controlling shareholders.  When a controlling shareholder is present, the 
board emphasizes committee composition and is no more likely than 
non-independent boards to adopt other mechanisms.  The results suggest 
that in many ways, board behavior is similar and that voluntary adoption 
of monitoring mechanisms across all firms has increased in recent years.  
                                                            
 1. See Peter Klein et al., Corporate Governance, Family Ownership and Firm Value: The 
Canadian Evidence, 13 CORP. GOV.: INT’L. REV. 769 (2005); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate 
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999). 
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In addition, voluntary adoption appears to increase if the firm is large or 
has shares cross-listed in the U.S. 
The inconclusive relation between the level of board independence 
and firm performance has puzzled both academic researchers and practi-
tioners: while regulators strongly advocate the presence of a majority of 
independent directors on company boards, researchers struggle to find 
evidence that their presence actually enhances firm performance.2  Based 
on the results of this study, perhaps part of the reason that performance 
cannot be convincingly linked to board independence lies in the fact that 
independent boards act similarly to their non-independent counterparts. 
Building on the influential work of Berle and Means,3 Part II re-
views the relevant literature used to derive the formal, testable hypothe-
sis that independent boards differ in their propensity to voluntarily adopt 
monitoring mechanisms.  Part III outlines governance guidelines in Can-
ada, summarizes the shareholding characteristics of the sample firms, 
and provides details on the corporate governance guidelines examined in 
the study.  Part IV describes the empirical methodology used in this 
study and sets forth our empirical results and robustness tests.  Finally, 
Part V discusses the contributions of the study, its limitations, and its 
legal implications. 
II.  RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
A.  Agency Costs and the Role of the Board 
Researchers and practitioners in economics, finance, and general 
management have long used agency theory to describe inherent conflicts 
of interest among the various stakeholders of a corporation.  Broadly 
speaking, agency theory recognizes that managers who have the ability 
to make key decisions about the firm’s operations may choose alterna-
tives that directly benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders.  
Managers, for instance, may be tempted to divert valuable resources 
away from the best interests of the firm and use them for their own per-
sonal gain. 
Traditionally, agency theory has been viewed as an accurate depic-
tion of the relationship between management and shareholders in widely 
held corporations.  In such firms, separation of ownership (shareholders) 
and control (management) facilitates management’s ability to act in self-
                                                            
 2. For a summary of this research, see David Finegold et al., Corporate Boards and Company 
Performance: Review of Research in Light of Recent Reforms, 15 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 865 
(2007). 
 3. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932). 
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serving ways because individual shareholders hold a relatively small por-
tion of the company’s shares.  Typical of the classic Berle and Means 
view of the widely held firm, the large number of small shareholders im-
plies that a single small shareholder has neither the power nor the incen-
tive to devote significant resources to monitor management’s behavior 
and undertake corrective action when appropriate.4 
Although widely held corporations are common in some countries, 
such as the United States, different ownership configurations are more 
popular in other countries.  For example, ownership can be concentrated 
in large shareholders such as founding families, executives, or institu-
tional investors.5  Agency theory is also applicable in this context be-
cause large shareholders are often either directly or indirectly involved in 
managing the affairs of a corporation.  As a result, conflicts of interest 
can still arise, but they may be driven primarily by the divergence of in-
terests between large and small shareholders.  Large shareholders may 
prompt management to behave in a way consistent with their own inter-
ests at the expense of smaller, minority shareholders.  On the other hand, 
large shareholders may be better positioned to advocate for value-
increasing changes in firm policy when significant conflicts between 
managers and shareholders do arise.6  The loss resulting from these ac-
tions and the expense of implementing mechanisms designed to reduce 
this opportunistic behavior are described as agency costs.7 
Given the prevalence of agency costs across all firms, regardless of 
ownership structure, shareholders have devised a variety of ways for at-
tempting to reduce these costs.  For example, some corporate governance 
techniques include increasing the firm’s debt level to reduce the amount 
of cash under management’s discretion,8 creating compensation contracts 
aimed at aligning the interests of shareholders and managers,9 and rely-
ing on the competitiveness of the market for a firm’s products and its 
managerial talent.10  Most relevant to the current discussion is the use of 
                                                            
 4. See id.; Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. 
POL. ECON. 461 (1986). 
 5. See La Porta et al., supra note 1. 
 6. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 4, at 472–74. 
 7. See Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 8. Michael Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 
AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323–29 (1986). 
 9. See Michael Jensen & Kevin Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 
98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 261–62 (1990). 
 10. Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 289 
(1980). 
2010] Monitoring to Reduce Agency Costs 813 
the board of directors as an active monitor with the ability to observe 
management’s behavior and undertake corrective action as needed.11 
Our collective understanding of board processes continues to 
evolve with recent research that suggests a stewardship role for directors.  
Under this perspective, directors view themselves as actively collaborat-
ing with and advising the management of a firm.  However, in most situ-
ations, directors see such a role as an addition to their more traditional 
function as monitors; in this way, directors strive to find a balance be-
tween acting as both monitors and advisors to the managerial team.12 
B.  Independent Directors and Board Monitoring 
Because it is important to monitor managers, it is unsurprising that 
many studies seek to find ways for the board to improve its performance 
of this task.  One of the most common recommendations has been to en-
sure that independent directors are on the firm’s board.  These indepen-
dent directors are unassociated with the firm’s management team and are 
free from any business connections linking them with the company.  In-
dependent directors may have particularly high incentives to effectively 
carry out the monitoring function because their reputation and the value 
of their human capital depend on their expertise in this area.13 
The idea that independent directors can bring much-needed man-
agement oversight to the operations of the board has given rise to advo-
cates for independent boards worldwide.  Canadian guidelines initially 
recommended board independence (formally defined below) when the 
Toronto Stock Exchange adopted the recommendations of the Report of 
the Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in 
Canada (Dey Committee) in 1995.  The U.S. stock exchanges altered 
their listing standards to require companies to maintain a majority of in-
dependent directors after the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
(SOX) in 2002.14  Outside the North American context, international or-
ganizations (such as the OECD) and national stock exchanges in many 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Portugal, and Cyprus, 
have advocated for board independence.  Given the call for independence 
from regulators and investors around the globe, many companies have 
                                                            
 11. Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 
301, 311 (1983). 
 12. See David Anderson et al., The Evolution of Corporate Governance: Power Redistribution 
Brings Boards to Life, 15 CORP. GOV.: INT’L. REV. 780, 791 (2007); Renee Adams & Daniel Ferrei-
ra, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 218 (2007). 
 13. Fama, supra note 10. 
 14. Although the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was passed in 2002, it was not until 2003 that the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission approved changes to the governance requirements of the United 
States’ stock exchanges.  Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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responded.  U.S. corporations have recently experienced significant in-
creases in board independence,15  and although this trend has been 
somewhat slower in other countries, the rate of adoption of independent 
boards is nevertheless becoming significant around the world.  For ex-
ample, a majority of Irish firms maintain independent boards, as do the 
largest Greek firms.16  Moving beyond a single country analysis, Dahya, 
Dimitrov, and McConnell examined the prevalence of independent 
boards in a cross-country study of firms from twenty-two countries and 
showed that the pervasiveness of adopting independent boards is truly 
global in nature.17 
It has been widely debated whether boards with independent direc-
tors actually act as better monitors.  If boards with a relatively high pro-
portion of independent members are better boards, then we should expect 
this difference to be reflected in the firm’s performance.  However, re-
search linking board structure and firm performance remains inconclu-
sive, and studies have failed to find that having a majority of independent 
directors results in improved firm financial performance.18 
C.  Board Processes vs. Performance Outcome 
Because explorations of board composition and firm outcomes have 
provided inconclusive results, this paper proposes an alternative method 
to evaluate whether boards with a significant number of independent di-
rectors differ from non-independent boards in their propensity to monitor 
managerial behavior and reduce agency costs.  This approach is unique 
in that it focuses on board actions rather than on firm outcomes such as 
performance, which can be largely influenced by factors outside of ma-
nagerial or board control.  Instead, our approach examines whether inde-
pendent boards are more likely to adopt additional tools to assist them in 
their monitoring function.  If independent directors have greater incen-
tives to act as diligent monitors,19 we would expect that they would equip 
                                                            
 15. See Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, The Changing Structure of U.S. Corporate 
Boards: 1997–2003, 15 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 1215 (2007); Sharon Lee & Loring Carlson, The 
Changing Board of Directors: Board Independence in S&P 500 Firms, 11 J. ORG. CULTURE COMM. 
& CONFLICT 31 (2007). 
 16. See Niamh Brennan & Michael McDermott, Alternative Perspectives on Independence of 
Directors, 12 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 325 (2004); Lena Tsipouri & Manolis Xanthakis, Can Corpo-
rate Governance Be Rated?  Ideas Based on the Greek Experience, 12 CORP. GOV.: INT’L. REV. 16 
(2004). 
 17. Jay Dahya, Orlin Dimitrov & John McConnell, Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards 
and Corporate Value: A Cross-Country Analysis, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 73, 74 (2008). 
 18. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence 
and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002); Finegold et al., supra note 2; Klein et 
al., supra note 1. 
 19. Fama & Jensen, supra note 11, at 314–15. 
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themselves with additional tools contained in the list of best practices to 
facilitate this role.  This supposition is formally defined in terms of the 
following hypothesis: Firms with independent boards will be more likely 
than those without independent boards to voluntarily adopt mechanisms 
designed to enhance the board’s capability to monitor management.  
This hypothesis can be viewed as an examination of the extent to which 
the board processes of independent and non-independent boards are simi-
lar.  In this way, the research provides insights on the “black box of 
board process”20 while also documenting the extent to which firms adopt 
voluntary governance mechanisms.  In the parts below, we describe the 
empirical context and the methodology used to test this hypothesis. 
III.  EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
Several features of the empirical context warrant discussion.  First, 
we outline the specifics of the Canadian corporate governance regime, 
and then we formally define the board independence used here.  Second, 
we provide summary statistics on the level of board independence for the 
sample firms over the five-year period under study.  Third, we examine 
shareholder characteristics and the ownership structure of the sample 
firms.  This examination reveals significant deviation from the common 
view of the corporation as a widely held entity.  Finally, we describe the 
precise monitoring mechanisms that we examined, and we provide sum-
mary statistics on their adoption rates. 
A.  Applicable Regulations Related to Governance and Disclosure in the 
Canadian Governance Regime 
Canadian law has historically made corporate governance the re-
sponsibility of the board of directors, and until recently, Canada relied 
solely on voluntary governance guidelines established by the Dey Com-
mittee and the responsibility of the board to respond to these guidelines.  
An analysis of Canadian corporations therefore allows us to examine 
whether boards voluntarily adopt corporate governance mechanisms in 
order to assist them in monitoring firm management. 
The current Canadian corporate governance regime originated in 
1995 when the Toronto Stock Exchange adopted the recommendations of 
the Dey Committee Report entitled, Where Were the Directors?21 (“Dey 
Report”).  Although the TSX set forth these recommendations, corpora-
                                                            
 20. See Richard Leblanc & Mark Schwartz, The Black Box of Board Process: Gaining Access 
to a Difficult Subject, 15 CORP. GOV.: INT’L. REV. 843 (2007). 
 21. TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CANADA, 
WHERE WERE THE DIRECTORS?  GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CANADA 
(1994) [hereinafter Dey Report].  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
816 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
tions were not required to implement them; however, each company 
listed on the TSX was required to describe in its annual report or infor-
mation circular whether or not it had adopted the guidelines produced by 
the committee.  If a company decided not to adopt the recommended 
guidelines, it had to disclose the relevant explanation. 
From 1995 to 1998, requirements regarding firm disclosure of these 
governance practices were not overly stringent or well-defined.  Al-
though the regulations required a firm to disclose its compliance with the 
recommended practices, they did not require firms to conform to a stan-
dardized format for such disclosure.  A review of information circulars 
during this period indicates that the extent and the format of the disclo-
sure varied significantly, thus making it difficult to understand firms’ 
governance practices on a comparative basis.  The situation changed in 
1999 when TSX formally altered the disclosure requirements.  With re-
spect to information circulars issued for fiscal year 1999 and onward, the 
TSX required that firms disclose their compliance with the recommended 
practices in a standard tabular format. 22  As a result, 1999 marks the start 
of the sample period.  The TSX did not implement any significant 
changes in disclosure requirements during the period of this study. 
The voluntary guidelines from the Dey Committee remain the 
foundation of the Canadian governance regime.  The Dey Committee 
guidelines are one of the earliest adoptions of corporate governance rules 
among developed nations,23 but despite the relatively long history of the 
Canadian guidelines, it is clear that corporate governance of Canadian 
firms has the potential to be heavily influenced by the proximity of the 
United States.  The United States issued its first formal statement on cor-
porate governance two years after the Dey Report, but substantial 
changes to U.S. corporate governance practices have been made since 
then.  These changes culminated in 2002 with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
(SOX).24 
The governance practices contained in SOX form an integral part of 
the Canadian governance environment.  This is due to two factors: first, 
several Canadian firms have their shares listed on U.S. stock exchanges 
and therefore are bound by SOX; and second, several non-cross-listed 
                                                            
 22. In 1999, TSX stated that the disclosure should take a certain format.  See Letter from Clare 
Gaudet, Vice President Corporate Finance Services, Toronto Stock Exchange (Nov. 17, 1999) (on 
file with authors). 
 23. Britain’s Cadbury Report was issued in late 1992.  For more information on the Cadbury 
Report, see THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE 
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1992), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/ 
documents/cadbury.pdf. 
 24. A comprehensive list of corporate governance codes by nation can be obtained from the 
European Corporate Governance Institute, available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/. 
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firms have begun to voluntarily adopt the requirements set out in SOX.25  
In this study’s examination of the monitoring mechanisms that firms can 
but are not required to adopt, elements from both the Dey Committee 
guidelines and SOX are included.26 
The sample period ends in 2003.  After that date, cross-listed firms 
were required to comply with SOX.  By 2004, Canadian governance reg-
ulations also evolved to include some mandatory elements.  Therefore, 
2003 marks the last year when adoption of corporate governance me-
chanisms to assist the board in monitoring firm management was purely 
voluntary. 
For each of the five sample years, we reviewed the information cir-
culars for firms in the TSX/S&P market index (formerly the TSE 300), 
and we hand-collected the data on the governance mechanisms employed 
by each firm.  In total, we examined over 1200 proxy circulars. 
B.  Formally Defining Board Independence 
Many of the guidelines suggested by the Dey Committee refer to 
the board of directors and its role.  Perhaps most importantly, the Dey 
Committee recommended that the board should have a structure that 
enables it to act independently from management.  Recommended as-
pects of this structure include appointing a chair who is not a member of 
the firm’s executive team and maintaining a majority of independent di-
rectors.  Securities regulations require Canadian firms to include in their 
proxy circulars details on the members of the board and their relation to 
the firm with regard to whether they are “unrelated” or “independent.”  
Independent directors are not involved in the firm management, whereas 
unrelated directors are both independent and “free from any interest and 
any business or other relationship which could, or could reasonably be 
perceived to, materially interfere with the director’s ability to act with a 
view to the best interests of the corporation.”27 
Thus, in our study, classifying each board member as “indepen-
dent” involves a conservative approach that requires the director to be 
both independent and unrelated to the firm.  While the term “indepen-
                                                            
 25. Anita Anand, Frank Milne & Lynnette Purda, Voluntary Adoption of Corporate Gover-
nance Mechanisms, (Soc. Sci. Res. Network Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=921450. 
 26. Although the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was officially passed in 2002, many of its recommenda-
tions did not immediately take effect.  See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002).  In fact, none of the mechanisms that we examine were mandated for foreign firms for the 
fiscal year of 2003, and therefore their adoption before this time was voluntary.  Id.  Of course, 
Canadian firms with cross-listed securities may have begun to adopt these mechanisms in anticipa-
tion of required compliance.  We address this issue in our robustness tests, infra Part IV.E. 
 27. See Dey Report, supra note 21; see also discussion infra Part III.D. 
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dent” is used for brevity and consistency with the prior literature, it 
should be noted that the term is used in the stricter sense of “unrelated” 
as defined by the Dey Committee.  Similarly, a board is defined as inde-
pendent if it includes either a majority of independent directors or an in-
dependent chair. 
The proportion of firms with independent boards remains relatively 
constant over time.  Table 1 examines the proportion of sample firms that 
maintain an independent chair, a majority of independent directors, or 
both, and the extent to which adoption of these features has altered from 
1999 to 2003.  The consistency of board independence is striking: the 
proportion of boards with a majority of independent members fluctuated 
only within a narrow range, moving from a low of 82.8% to a high of 
87.4%.  Even in 1999, the first year with standardized disclosure, over 
80% of firms in the sample had boards with a majority of independent 
directors.  Panel A of Table 1 shows that across all years, 85% of firms 
had boards with greater than 50% independent members.  A T-test of the 
difference in the level of majority independence between 1999 and 2003 
fails to find a significant difference in the proportion of firms with inde-
pendent boards between the first and last years of the sample. 
Table 1 also reveals that it is far less common to maintain board in-
dependence through the presence of an independent chair.  Only 36% of 
observations across all years had independent chairs.  However, this pro-
portion has slowly but monotonically increased from a low of 32.7% in 
1999 to high of 41.9% in 2003.  Unlike the difference in the proportion 
of firms with a majority of independent directors, the two proportions 
stated above are statistically different from one another, which indicates 
a significant change in the number of independent chairs over the five-
year period. 
In addition, almost all firms that maintain an independent chair also 
choose to appoint a majority of independent directors.  There is little dif-
ference in the sample proportions between firms that maintain indepen-
dent chairs and those that ensure independence through the combination 
of the majority of independent directors and an independent chair.  Panel 
B of Table 1 confirms this finding and shows that the presence of an in-
dependent chair without an independent board occurs in only 1.5% of the 
sample.  Furthermore, correlation between the presence of an indepen-
dent chair and the presence of a combination of independent chair and a 
majority of independent directors is in excess of 0.96. 
Based on our research, it appears that having a majority of indepen-
dent directors is almost a necessary condition for the appointment of an 
independent chair.  As a result, a board is defined to be independent if it 
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includes either a majority of independent directors or an independent 
chair.28 
C.  Shareholder Characteristics of Canadian Firms 
The ownership structure of Canadian firms varies significantly.  In 
some cases, the Berle and Means view of widely held firms is an accu-
rate description of Canadian corporations, but there are also a large num-
ber of family firms and firms with significant block holdings in our sam-
ple.29  Since the underlying shareholding characteristics of the firm are 
likely to influence its propensity to maintain board independence and to 
voluntarily adopt additional monitoring mechanisms, the presence of 
block holdings, majority voters, and cross-listed firms is carefully con-
trolled for by collecting shareholder information from the information 
circulars of the firms studied. 
We collected data on whether firms displayed certain characteristics 
and the effect those characteristics had on whether the board adopted 
voluntary monitoring mechanisms.  Panel B of Table 2 provides a corre-
lation matrix of five shareholding characteristics that may influence both 
the propensity of a firm’s board to be independent and its likelihood to 
voluntarily adopt the recommended corporate governance mechanisms: 
the presence of family blocks, executive blocks, blocks owned by other 
investors, and majority voters, as well as whether the firm’s shares are 
cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. 
Block holdings by firm executives, founding families, or other in-
vestors (generally institutions) must be distinguished from one another 
because their roles in monitoring firm management may differ.30  For 
instance, family block holders may have incentives to expropriate from 
smaller shareholders, which implies that firms with family block hold-
ings are less likely to adopt monitoring mechanisms.31  In contrast, block 
holdings composed of institutional investors have been suggested to ac-
                                                            
 28. However, this essentially equates to maintaining a majority of independent directors be-
cause only sixteen of 1,078 sample firms maintained an independent chair without a majority of 
independent directors. 
 29. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3.  In Canada, securities regulations require disclosure of any 
individual or group with 10% or more of the outstanding shareholder votes.  See, e.g., Securities Act, 
R.S.O., 1990, c.S.5, as amended, part XX, section 102.1 (Can). 
 30. It is also noteworthy that block holdings of one type are not associated with the presence of 
block holdings of a different type.  Correlations between three types of block holdings are all nega-
tive implications that firms maintaining insider block holdings by families or executives are less 
likely to have significant holdings by institutional investors.  This is true despite the fact that the 
most common type of block holding within the sample is the “other” category, representing 44.84% 
of observations, followed by the executive block at 18.69% and the family block at 14.85%. 
 31. See Ronald Anderson & David Reeb, Board Composition: Balancing Family Influence in 
S&P 500 Firms, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 209 (2004). 
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tively participate in monitoring firm management; this suggests a posi-
tive relation between voluntary adoption of these mechanisms and the 
presence of these block holdings.32  The prediction for executive block 
holdings is not clear; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny propose a non-linear 
relation between managerial ownership and firm value, in which value 
increases when management maintains a relatively small proportion of 
shares but declines as managerial shareholdings become large and man-
agement becomes entrenched.33  Table 2 shows the likelihood of multiple 
blocks and the relation between block types.34 
A majority voter is defined as an individual or group who has con-
trol of over 50% of the firm’s votes.  We speculate that the incentives for 
these owners to voluntarily adopt additional corporate governance me-
chanisms will be low since the owners effectively have control of the 
company and therefore have little need to please minority investors.  In 
stark contrast to the widely held view of the firm, 28.17% of the observa-
tions have a majority voter.  The presence of these controlling sharehold-
ers is most strongly associated with the presence of family block hold-
ings.  Firms with majority voters are less likely to maintain independent 
boards, as indicated by the correlation of -0.19 between these two cha-
racteristics. 
In contrast, cross-listing in the United States may force firms to en-
hance their governance practices35 and to improve the quality of their 
financial disclosures.36  Firms that are willing to subject themselves to 
the increased scrutiny through cross-listing may thereby also be willing 
to voluntarily adopt additional monitoring mechanisms.  Table 2 shows 
that 46.85% of sample observations are cross-listed and that cross-listed 
firms are less likely to have block holdings of any type. 
The widespread presence of significant block holdings, majority 
voters, and cross-listed firms emphasizes the importance of controlling 
                                                            
 32. See Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 570–75 
(1990). 
 33. Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Management Ownership and Market 
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1988). 
 34. Data is collected for all block holdings within a firm to incorporate cases where large 
shareholdings are held by multiple groups, such as both a founding family and an institutional inves-
tor.  There is no limit on the number of different kinds of block holdings that may be present.  In 
cases where a family member is also a member of management, the block holding is classified to be 
an executive block. 
 35. See Andreas Charitou et al., Cross-Listing, Bonding Hypothesis and Corporate Gover-
nance, 34 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1286, 1294 (2007). 
 36. Mark Lang, Karl Lins & Darius Miller, ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing 
in the United States Improve a Firm’s Information Environment and Increase Market Value?, 41 J. 
ACCT. RES. 317, 337 (2003); Mark Lang, Jana Raedy & Michelle Yetman, How Representative Are 
Firms That Are Cross-Listed in the United States? An Analysis of Accounting Quality, 41 J. ACCT. 
RES. 363, 365 (2003). 
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for their influence when establishing whether independent boards are 
more likely to adopt certain governance mechanisms.  This evidence also 
points to the potential for these characteristics to influence the determina-
tion of board independence itself.  Overall, 85% of the sample firms 
maintained independent boards, and T-tests from Table 2 show that two 
of the shareholding characteristics, cross-listings and other block hold-
ings, are associated with significantly higher levels of independence than 
the sample of firms without these characteristics.  In contrast, the pres-
ence of a majority voter or block holdings by families and executives are 
associated with significantly lower rates of board independence.37 
D.  Voluntary Monitoring Mechanisms 
Canada’s voluntary monitoring mechanisms are contained in the 
Dey Committee’s report.38  The Dey Report provided fourteen recom-
mendations, or guidelines, with respect to the composition and function 
of the board of directors.  Of these recommendations, Guidelines 1 and 
10 are most relevant in terms of outlining the board’s governance re-
sponsibilities.  Guideline 1 charges the board of directors with the ulti-
mate responsibility for the firm’s corporate governance: “The board of 
directors of every corporation should explicitly assume responsibility for 
the stewardship of the corporation.”  Guideline 10 specifically recom-
mends the formation of a governance committee: “Every board of direc-
tors should expressly assume responsibility for, or assign to a committee 
of directors, the general responsibility for developing the corporation’s 
approach to governance issues.”  Three other guidelines recommend 
practices to ensure that the board operates independently (including ap-
pointing the independent chair and a majority of independent directors) 
and suggest disclosure related to each director’s affiliation with the com-
pany.  Data relating to the remaining guidelines translated easily into 
four observable monitoring mechanisms that can be coded by variables 
equal to 1 if the company adopts the recommended practice and 0 other-
wise.  The precise guidelines examined are: 
1.  The audit committee is composed entirely of independent direc-
tors; 
                                                            
 37. Not only do these tests point to the importance of controlling for shareholding characteris-
tics in our analysis, they also make us aware of potential issues of multicollinearity and endogeneity. 
 38. Dey Report, supra note 21, at Guideline 12(i).  The TSX adopted the Dey Report in Febru-
ary 1995, and on May 3, 1995, it released TSE By-Law 19.17, which requires companies incorpo-
rated in a Canadian jurisdiction and listed on the Exchange to make annual disclosures regarding 
their corporate governance practices in an annual report or information circular.  These guidelines 
went into effect beginning with companies whose fiscal year ended on June 30, 1995.  See Toronto 
Stock Exchange, Guidelines, in TSX COMPANY MANUAL § 472 (2004) (listing the fourteen recom-
mendations of the Dey Committee). 
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2.  The compensation committee is composed entirely of indepen-
dent directors; 
3.  Directors are permitted to independently hire advisors; and 
4.  Formal training is provided for new board members. 
The guidelines for which data has not been collected could not be 
easily coded to reflect a voluntary willingness to enhance the board’s 
monitoring capabilities.  For instance, Guideline 7 recommends that the 
board review its size to ensure that the board can operate effectively.  
While it can potentially be deciphered whether or not this review has 
taken place, a subjective judgment would have to be made as to whether 
the outcome of the review enhanced, deteriorated, or left unchanged the 
board’s ability to reduce agency costs.39  As a result, the analysis does 
not include this recommendation. 
In addition to these four mechanisms, we collected data for three 
variables that emerged in SOX.  Although these variables were prompted 
by SOX and eventually became mandatory for Canadian firms with 
cross-listed securities in the United States, early discussions in Canada 
suggested that Canadian regulators viewed them favorably as well.40  
Therefore, in keeping with our focus on recommended but not required 
practices, we collected data on the following additional monitoring me-
chanisms, which again are easily observed and coded as 1 when adopted 
and 0 otherwise.  These are: 
1.  Adoption of a code of ethics; 
2.  Certification of financial statements; and 
3.  Presence of a financial expert on the audit committee.41 
                                                            
 39. The remaining guidelines for which data was not collected include the following: a recom-
mendation that the board develop position descriptions for directors and the CEO, that there should 
be a process put in place for evaluating directors, and that the board should review its compensation 
of directors. 
 40. These three monitoring mechanisms were to be contained in Canadian legislation proposed 
in early 2004.  To examine the request for comments regarding this initiative, see Request for Com-
ment, available at http://www.msc.gov.mb.ca/legal_docs/legislation/notices/58_101notice.pdf.  For 
the final rules, see Multilateral Instrument 52-110: Audit Committees (2004), available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20040326_52-110-audit-
comm.jsp; Multilateral Instrument 52-109: Certification of Disclosure in Issuers’ Annual and Interim 
Filings (2004), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_ 
20040326_52-109-cert.jsp; National Policy 58-201, available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Secu 
ritiesLaw_rule_20050617_58-201_corp-gov-guidelines.jsp.  All of these instruments were proposed 
in January 2004. 
 41. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act indicates that the Securities and Exchange Commission should 
define financial expert and provides guidelines in developing that definition: 
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While none of the sample firms were required to implement these 
practices during the time period studied, Table 3 shows that a number of 
the firms chose both to adopt and to voluntarily disclose the adoption of 
these mechanisms.  While Canadian disclosure requirements have been 
standardized for the Dey recommendations, they do not encompass the 
practices mandated by SOX.  This may cause a downward bias in the 
number of firms reporting adoption of the mandated practices.  Presuma-
bly, however, if a firm believes that there are benefits to voluntarily im-
plementing the practice, it is likely to reveal this to potential investors.42 
We examined these seven mechanisms both individually and in ag-
gregate through the formation of an index that allocates one point for 
each mechanism adopted, up to a maximum of seven points.  Creation of 
such indices in corporate governance research is common,43 and no 
judgment is made on the value of each recommended guideline, weight-
ing each one equally.  In addition to the full aggregate index, a second 
index is defined, reflecting only the last five recommended guidelines.  It 
is plausible that the ability to staff committees exclusively with indepen-
dent directors is mechanically related to the number and proportion of 
independent directors available on the board.  As a result, the first two 
mechanisms related to audit and compensation committee composition 
are excluded from the index to form a reduced index of voluntary adop-
tion. 
As a first observation, our results show that in the Canadian con-
text, recommendations can be an effective means of encouraging firms to 
adopt better governance practices.  Table 3 provides a preliminary ex-
amination of the adoption of these seven mechanisms both across the 
                                                                                                                                     
In defining the term ‘‘financial expert’’ for purposes of subsection (a), the Commission 
shall consider whether a person has, through education and experience as a public ac-
countant or auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting 
officer of an issuer, or from a position involving the performance of similar functions— 
(1) an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial 
statements; 
 (2) experience in— 
(A) the preparation or auditing of financial statements of generally com-
parable issuers; and 
(B) the application of such principles in connection with the accounting 
for estimates, accruals, and reserves; 
 (3) experience with internal accounting controls; and 
 (4) an understanding of audit committee functions. 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407(b), 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 42. Robustness tests ensure that the primary results are not sensitive to this assumption by 
including only those mechanisms covered by disclosure guidelines. 
 43. See, e.g., Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 
107 (2003); Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environ-
ment, and Valuation, 60 J. FIN. 1461 (2005). 
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entire sample and on the basis of independent versus non-independent 
boards.  Overall, the average level of adoption is 3.91 mechanisms, with 
independent boards adopting slightly more, at 4.02, and non-independent 
boards adopting fewer—on average, 3.20. 
Only a few firm-year observations have chosen not to implement 
any of the seven recommended practices.  Figure 1 illustrates the distri-
bution of index values across the sample for both the full index and the 
reduced index excluding committee membership.  Although adopting all 
seven practices was also rare during the sample period, the most common 
adoption level has been 5.  For the reduced index, the number of me-
chanisms adopted most frequently is 3.  However, in comparison to the 
full index, a larger proportion of firms chose not to adopt any of the me-
chanisms, which may indicate a particular importance placed on commit-
tee membership.  Table 3, which finds that maintaining an independent 
audit committee is the most commonly adopted practice across the sam-
ple, confirms this observation. 
While recommendations related to corporate governance have been 
in place in Canada since 1995, increased focus on corporate governance 
in recent years may have influenced firms to change their practices over 
time.  This possibility is examined in Figure 2, which plots the mean val-
ues for the full and reduced indices for both independent and non-
independent boards in each year of the sample.  Three important observa-
tions can be made from this figure.  First, even in 1999, firms were vo-
luntarily adopting corporate governance regardless of whether they main-
tained independent boards.  The average level of adopted mechanisms 
was over 3 for independent boards and over 2 for non-independent 
boards.  Second, adoption rates have been increasing steadily across the 
entire sample period.  This is true for both the full and the reduced index 
as well as for independent versus non-independent boards.  Third, inde-
pendent boards maintain a higher level of voluntary adoption across all 
years of the sample for the full index.  In recent years, however, adoption 
rates for the reduced index have converged such that there appears to be 
little difference between the behavior of independent and non-
independent boards. 
Univariate tests of differences in adoption rates for independent and 
non-independent firms across each of the seven mechanisms are pro-
vided in Table 3.  In all cases, a significantly higher proportion of firms 
with independent boards adopt specific recommendation.  Because this 
analysis does not account for differences in adoption rates over time,44 a 
                                                            
 44. Figure 2 identifies differences in adoption rates over time as being potentially very impor-
tant. 
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more detailed multivariate analysis of adoption rates is required and is 
described in the part below. 
IV.  MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS 
To provide evidence of whether independent and non-independent 
boards differ in their propensity to voluntarily adopt additional monitor-
ing mechanisms, we conducted a multivariate analysis in which the de-
pendent variable is either the full or the reduced index described above.  
The independent variables include control variables and a measure of 
board independence reflecting the presence of a majority of independent 
directors or an independent chair.  We also examined an alternative spe-
cification that includes a variable reflecting the presence of a majority of 
independent directors and an interaction term identifying cases in which 
both a majority of independent directors and an independent chair exist.45  
The purpose of this term is to establish whether an independent chair 
further enhances a board’s propensity to adopt recommended governance 
practices when a majority of independent directors is already present. 
A.  Additional Control Variables 
As we have seen, the shareholder characteristics of a firm may in-
fluence both the adoption of additional governance mechanisms and the 
presence of an independent board.  Accordingly, the multivariate analy-
sis controls for the presence of block holdings (family, executive, or 
“other”), a majority voter, and cross-listed shares.  The expectation is 
that governance adoption will be positively related to cross-listings and 
other blocks, but negatively related to family blocks and majority voters.  
The relationship is unclear with respect to executive holdings. 
Six additional characteristics that arguably influence firms’ gover-
nance decisions are also included as independent variables.  As evident 
from Figure 2, governance patterns have changed dramatically over time; 
therefore, a “Year Count” variable is defined and set equal to 0 in 1999, 
1 in 2000 and so on until reaching a maximum value of 4 in 2003.  In 
addition, since many have argued that there are fixed costs associated 
with implementing certain governance practices and that these costs are 
therefore more onerous for small firms to bear, the size of the firm is 
measured by the lagged value of the natural logarithm of total assets. 
The remaining four control variables fall into two categories.  The 
first category aims to capture a firm’s need to appeal to either existing or 
potential investors.  The intuition is that the more a firm is potentially 
                                                            
 45. Recall that there are extremely few cases in which an independent chair exists without a 
majority of independent directors.  See discussion, supra Part III.B. 
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dependent on investors for funds, the more it will attempt to demonstrate 
that it values the interests of these investors by putting mechanisms in 
place to ensure that their funds are not expropriated by management or 
large shareholders.  To measure the firm’s funding needs, two variables 
are adapted from Durnev and Kim.46  The first variable, investment op-
portunity, is measured by the annual percentage growth in sales in the 
year prior to the measurement of the governance indices.  The second 
variable measures the need for external finance, given a certain level of 
investment opportunities, and is defined as the difference between the 
firm’s sustainable growth rate and its actual growth rate.47  Any amount 
of growth that the firm cannot support on its own must be funded by ex-
ternal sources.  Both investment opportunities and the need for external 
funds are expected to be positively related to a firm’s voluntary adoption 
of governance mechanisms. 
The final category of control variables relates to the potential size 
of the agency costs experienced by the firm.  Recall that these costs in-
corporate uses of cash that are inconsistent with the best interests of 
shareholders and expenses incurred to prevent these uses.  Gompers and 
Lerner argue that agency problems will be greater when assets are in-
tangible because tangible assets can be more easily sold upon liquidation 
of the firm and therefore require less monitoring.48  In a similar vein, 
Khanna argues that high levels of research and development (R&D) 
spending may be consistent with over-spending due to managerial em-
pire building, while Durnev and Kim argue that these expenses proxy for 
the intangibility of corporate resources and therefore, for greater poten-
tial agency costs.49 
In line with this literature, our study includes two measures of asset 
tangibility as control variables.  The first is the value of property, plants, 
and equipment scaled by total assets, which is expected to be negatively 
related to the level of voluntary adoption.  Firms with tangible assets 
need not expend significant resources to monitor these assets.  The 
second is R&D expenses scaled by total assets, which is expected to be 
                                                            
 46. Durnev & Kim, supra note 43, at 1464. 
 47. Following Demirgüç–Kunt and Maksimovic, sustainable growth is measured as return on 
equity/(1 - return on equity), and actual growth is measured as the annual growth rate in total assets.  
These values are taken from the year prior to the measurement of the governance variables.  See Asli 
Demirgüç–Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, Finance, and Firm Growth, 53 J. FIN. 2107, 2110–11 
(1998). 
 48. PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 164 (MIT Press 2004); 
Durnev & Kim, supra note 43. 
 49. Arun Khanna, Managerial Ownership and Firm Value: Agency Problems of Empire Build-
ing and Overvalued Equity at 12 (May 6, 2005), available at http://www.fma.org/SLC/Papers/Ma 
nagerialOwnership3.pdf; Durnev & Kim, supra note 43, at 1474. 
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positively related to the number of additional monitoring mechanisms 
adopted. 50 
Table 4 provides summary statistics for these control variables and 
their expected relation to the voluntary adoption of monitoring mechan-
isms.  Because of potential endogeneity issues between financial charac-
teristics and governance practices, all variables are measured in the year 
prior to measuring the indices of voluntary adoption.  Panel A of the ta-
ble provides the mean value for each variable for the full sample, its first 
and ninety-ninth percentiles, and average values across both independent 
and non-independent boards.  T-statistics for differences in the values of 
these variables across board type are also presented. 
There are no systematic differences in the need for funds, asset tan-
gibility, or size across the two sub-samples of firms.  Although the aver-
age value of market to book for firms with both board types does not en-
ter into the analysis as a control variable, the table also reports it.  Mar-
ket-to-book value has commonly been used as the measure of overall 
firm performance,51 and within this sample, there is no systematic differ-
ence in its value across boards with independent versus non-independent 
firms, providing further evidence on the difficulty of establishing a con-
sistent link between governance and performance. 
Panel B of Table 4 provides pair-wise correlations among the con-
trol variables related to size, year, need for funds, and asset tangibility.  
The strongest relation is the negative correlation between R&D expenses 
and firm size.  This indicates that the R&D variable may be capturing 
relatively young start-up firms that are still small in size.  Significantly, 
positive association between investment opportunity and R&D is also 
consistent with the rapid growth experienced by junior firms.  In con-
trast, size is negatively related to investment opportunities but positively 
related to the need for external finance, which indicates that larger firms 
have slowed in their year-to-year sales growth but remain heavily depen-
dent on external capital markets for finance. 
Our study collected data for the control variables from the Canadian 
version of the Compustat database.  Despite the fact that the sample in-
cludes only firms contained in the S&P/TSX index—the primary market 
index for Canada—not all firms are included in the database, and for 
some firms, the data is incomplete.  Moving to the multivariate analysis 
                                                            
 50. Research and development expenses are frequently missing for observations in Compustat.  
Rather than eliminating observations with missing data, we follow Durnev and Kim’s practice of 
replacing missing R&D observations with a value of 0.  The logic behind this is that firms that fail to 
report R&D may do so because they do not have R&D expenditures.  Eliminating these firms would 
then bias the sample toward industries whose R&D spending is significant.  Durnev & Kim, supra 
note 43, at 1477. 
 51. See Gompers et al., supra note 43, at 151; Klein et al., supra note 1. 
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therefore results in a loss of observations.  However, approximately 700 
observations remain. 
B.  Model Specification 
The empirical specification linking the index that reflects monitor-
ing mechanisms to the dependent variables can take several forms.  
While the data contains elements of a panel in that it represents a cross-
section of firms over five years, it is a highly unbalanced panel.  Not all 
firms have available data for each year, and the average number of times 
a firm appears in the sample is only 2.6.  When a firm appears multiple 
times in the sample, it is clear that its level of governance adoption in 
one year is likely to be correlated with its level in other years.  This cor-
relation can be modeled by using either a random effects model52 or ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  A significant number of 
assumptions underlie the random effects model, and the Hausman test 
rejects its use.  Therefore, our study uses clustered standard errors that 
are robust to the presence of any correlation among observations from 
the same firm. 
The use of clustered standard errors permits a more accurate repre-
sentation of the dependent variable by using an ordered probit model.  
Ordered probit models are appropriate for models with discrete depen-
dent variables when these variables are inherently ranked from low to 
high, which is consistent with the constructed governance indices.53 
C.  Primary Results 
Table 5 provides the first multivariate results relating monitoring 
mechanisms to board independence, shareholding characteristics, and the 
additional control variables.  The columns of the table are divided into 
three sections.  The first section provides the expected relation between 
each independent variable and the index reflecting voluntary adoption of 
monitoring mechanisms.  The second section measures board indepen-
dence using our primary composite measure, including firms with either 
a majority of independent directors or an independent chair.  Finally, the 
third section replaces this independence definition with a distinct meas-
ure of majority independence and the interaction term that identifies 
firms with both majority independence and an independent chair. 
                                                            
 52. A random effects model (versus a fixed effects model) is appropriate when we believe the 
sampled cross-sectional units were drawn from a large population.  See WILLIAM GREENE, 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1997).  Because the sample includes only 268 individual compa-
nies, we believe that this is a consistent representation of the data. 
 53. GREENE, supra note 52. 
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Because Table 2 identified shareholding characteristics to be corre-
lated with the adoption of an independent board, these characteristics are 
initially excluded to avoid potential issues of multicollinearity.  Under 
the first specification of the model presented in Table 5, the full index of 
potential monitoring mechanisms ranging from 0 to 7 is the dependent 
variable within the ordered probit model, and the second specification 
uses the reduced index.  The number of observations increases slightly 
when moving to the reduced index because for some observations, it is 
impossible to establish if the audit and compensation committees were 
fully independent; thus, the full index could not be created.  Under both 
specifications, all included control variables (with the exception of prop-
erty, plant, and equipment (PP&E)) are estimated with the correct sign.  
Surprisingly, PP&E shows a significant positive relation with the adop-
tion of additional monitoring mechanisms, implying that firms with more 
tangible assets are more likely to adopt these mechanisms.  In contrast, 
R&D shows the expected sign and is significant for the full index, which 
implies that firms with high levels of R&D and more intangible re-
sources are more likely to protect these resources with additional moni-
toring. 
One possible explanation for counter-results for PP&E is that the 
variable is proxying for an omitted variable, such as industry effects.  We 
confirm this hypothesis by constructing thirteen dummy variables cor-
responding to the thirteen industry classifications established by Camp-
bell from 2-digit sic codes.54  When these variables are included, the 
PP&E variable becomes insignificant, while all other variables remain 
qualitatively similar.  The R&D variable, however, maintains its signific-
ance even with the industry dummies at a slightly reduced 6% signific-
ance level rather than the original 3%.55 
The control variables most significantly related to the adoption of 
monitoring mechanisms are the size of the firm, the year of observation, 
and the need for finance.  As expected, larger firms and firms in greater 
need of external funds adopt more governance mechanisms.  Although 
the relation between need for finance and monitoring mechanisms retains 
its statistical significance, it is stronger when the full index is examined 
than when the reduced index excluding committee composition is like-
wise examined. 
                                                            
 54. John Campbell, Understanding Risk and Return, 104 J. POL. ECON. 298, 316 (1996). 
 55. We also verified that the inclusion of industry dummies does not substantially alter the 
results from the full regression, including both financial and ownership characteristics.  While the 
results in these instances are essentially the same, we chose not to incorporate industry dummies in 
the reported tables because subsequent tests work with significantly smaller subsamples of the data, 
and the inclusion of these dummies would have the potential to over-identify the model. 
830 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
Having established that the control variables largely behave as ex-
pected, we turn to the key variable under consideration: board indepen-
dence.  We observe that the role of board independence is highly sensi-
tive to monitoring mechanisms.  When the index representing seven po-
tential mechanisms forms the dependent variable, board independence is 
positively related to adoption of these mechanisms at the 1% level.  In 
contrast, when the two variables related to independent committees are 
dropped from the analysis, independent boards are seen to be no more 
likely to voluntarily adopt the remaining five monitoring mechanisms. 
The remaining columns in Table 5 confirm this pattern and the spe-
cial role that board independence plays in ensuring independent board 
committees.  The third and fourth sets of coefficient estimates add the 
shareholder characteristics to the control variables and repeat the estima-
tion of the ordered probit model.  Before doing so, however, an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression is estimated including all eleven controls 
(two related to tangibility and two related to need for funds, year, size, 
and five shareholding characteristics).  Strictly speaking, OLS is not ap-
propriate for discrete ordered dependent variables; however, OLS esti-
mation allows for the calculation of variance inflation factors to establish 
the extent to which multicollinearity impacts the model’s estimation.  
Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price suggest that multicollinearity is a problem 
whenever the largest variance inflation factor exceeds 10 or the average 
of all factors is significantly greater than 1.56  For the variables used here, 
the average value is 1.17, while the largest factor is only 1.38, thus pro-
viding little indication of multicollinearity.  As a result, all control va-
riables are simultaneously incorporated into the analysis.57 
Including all variables confirms many of our previous findings.  
Size, year, and PP&E are all significantly positively related to monitor-
ing mechanisms, regardless of whether the full or the reduced index is 
used.  However, inclusion of industry dummies eliminates the signific-
ance of PP&E.  More importantly, however, is the confirmation that 
board independence is again positive and significant only when the full 
index of monitoring mechanisms is examined; board independence plays 
                                                            
 56. See SAMPRIT CHATTERJEE, ALI S. HADI & BERTRAM PRICE, REGRESSION ANALYSIS BY 
EXAMPLE (3d ed. 2000) (1977). 
 57. In addition to testing for multicollinearity, we considered the possibility of a two-stage 
instrumental variable regression.  Under this specification, board independence would be predicted 
by instruments correlated with independence, but unrelated to corporate governance mechanisms.  
Board size was considered as a potential instrument based on the findings of Vassallo and Wells that 
larger boards are more likely to be independent; however, in the current sample, size was found to be 
unreliably related to independence.  Vasallo & Wells, Firms’ Information Environments and Board 
Independence (Soc. Sci. Res. Network Working Paper, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=898065. 
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no role in establishing the propensity to adopt the reduced index exclud-
ing committees. 
Additional insights gained from incorporating the shareholding cha-
racteristics include the importance of cross-listing shares in the United 
States and the presence of a majority voter.  As expected, these variables 
have opposite effects, with cross-listings being positively and significant-
ly related to the adoption of additional monitoring mechanisms and the 
presence of a majority voter negatively influencing this adoption.  Inte-
restingly, the majority voter variable shares a similar pattern to board 
independence in that it is only a significant influence on governance for 
the full index when committee membership is included and fails to be 
important as a determinant of the reduced index. 
The final two model specifications in Table 5 confirm the role of 
control variables in that size, year, cross-listings, majority voter, and 
need for finance retain their significance.  All other control variables re-
main insignificant.  What is different in these final specifications, how-
ever, is that the incremental value of an independent chair when a ma-
jority of independent directors is already in place is established by in-
cluding both a variable identifying a majority of independent directors 
and an interaction term for cases in which an independent chair also ex-
ists.  These specifications make it apparent that the role of independence 
is highly sensitive to the precise governance mechanisms reviewed.  
Both measures are positively and significantly related to the full index, 
with the presence of an independent chair providing significant incre-
mental benefit over and above the importance of majority independence.  
In contrast, neither is important when the reduced index is examined. 
D.  Examining Committee Membership 
It is clear from the analysis in Table 5 that board independence does 
not play a consistent role in influencing the adoption of various monitor-
ing mechanisms.  For this reason, the seven mechanisms are considered 
individually in Table 6 using a probit model where the dependent varia-
ble is equal to 1 if a particular mechanism is adopted and to 0 otherwise.  
The same set of control variables are used as in Table 5. 
In general, moving from an aggregate index to its individual ele-
ments reduces the significance of many of the control variables.  Howev-
er, year of observation remains a powerful predictor of adoption across 
all mechanisms.  This implies that increases in the aggregate index level 
over time are not merely due to the adoption of more recently introduced 
mechanisms suggested by SOX, but rather are due to an overall increase 
in the level of adoption across all governance practices.  Size retains its 
significance across approximately half of the mechanisms, with a code of 
832 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
ethics, financial certification, and a financial expert on the audit commit-
tee being more common for larger firms. 
In examining monitoring mechanisms individually, two unique 
findings are apparent.  First, the presence of an independent board is sig-
nificantly related only to committee independence.  While positively re-
lated to both audit and compensation committee independence at the 1% 
level, board independence is an insignificant determinant of all other 
monitoring mechanisms.  Second, the presence of a majority voter plays 
a distinct role in whether committees are staffed with independent direc-
tors.  For both audit and compensation committees, the presence of a 
controlling shareholder makes it less likely that committees are indepen-
dent.  For all other monitoring mechanisms, the majority voter variable is 
insignificant. 
The unique relationship between board independence and commit-
tee membership warrants an investigation into whether this relationship 
is purely mechanical because firms with more independent directors nec-
essarily have more independent members available from whom to choose 
in staffing committees.  Table 7 addresses this issue and provides addi-
tional information on the dynamics of committee memberships over time 
by detailing the proportion of firms that had fully independent audit and 
compensation committees in each year of the sample for both firms with 
independent boards and those without. 
The first observation from Table 7 is the dramatic historical differ-
ence in committee composition between independent and non-
independent boards.  In 1999, 72.68% of firms with independent boards 
maintained fully independent audit committees.  However, this propor-
tion was only 17.65% for non-independent boards.  A dramatic differ-
ence was also apparent for the compensation committee, with 62.64% of 
independent boards maintaining independent committees, compared to 
23.53% of non-independent boards. 
Examining the dynamics of how these committee compositions 
have changed over time sheds some light on whether firms with non-
independent boards are unable to fully staff committees with independent 
members, either because boards have a shortage of these members or 
because boards have the capability to form independent committees but 
simply choose not to.  Investigation of audit committee composition 
shows that fully independent committees have become far more common 
for both types of boards.  However, the difference in the proportion of 
firms with independent audit committees in 1999 versus 2003 is statisti-
cally significant for both groups.  For firms with independent boards, this 
proportion has increased from 72.68% to 93.05%.  While this still signif-
icantly exceeds the proportion of non-independent boards, the gap is 
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much smaller in 2003 than in 1999, when the proportion of independent 
boards adopting this mechanism was greater by over 55%.  In just five 
years, the proportion of non-independent boards choosing to staff the 
audit committee solely with independent members has increased from 
17.65% to 69.57%.  Clearly, non-independent boards have the capacity 
to staff this committee with independent members if they so choose, with 
close to 70% making this decision in 2003. 
In contrast, the data regarding compensation committees has not 
demonstrated such a dramatic change.  While the proportion of non-
independent boards with independent compensation committees has in-
creased from 1999 to 2003, this increase is not statistically significant, 
nor has it been monotonic across all years.  The proportion of non-
independent boards adopting this mechanism had a low of 23.53% in 
1999, peaked in 2001 at 40%, and then declined to 30.43% in 2003.  In 
all years, independent boards are significantly more likely to maintain 
independent compensation committees with the proportion of adopters 
ranging from 62.64% to 81.38%.  It is apparent that non-independent 
boards place a much lower priority on maintaining an independent com-
pensation committee than an independent audit committee.  Independent 
boards have historically viewed both to be important; because of this, 
independent boards continue to increase their adoption rates of both me-
chanisms. 
E.  Robustness Tests 
In this section, we explore the sensitivity of the results to sample 
selection.  More specifically, we examine the roles of two key characte-
ristics that may influence a firm’s propensity to voluntarily adopt addi-
tional monitoring mechanisms: first, whether the firm has shares cross-
listed on an American exchange, and second, whether the firm has a ma-
jority voter.  Cross-listing may unduly influence voluntary adoption of 
governance mechanisms related to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.  While none 
of the mechanisms examined here were mandatory for firms within the 
sample period, firms may have begun adopting them in the expectation 
that they may become compulsory.  Support for this suggestion can be 
seen in Table 6, in which cross-listing is positively and significantly as-
sociated with the individual adoption of independent audit committees, 
compensation committees, and financial certification.  All three of these 
mechanisms are reforms contained in SOX.58  A more stringent test of 
our hypothesis on the influence of independent boards on monitoring 
mechanisms would therefore exclude cross-listed firms from the analy-
                                                            
 58. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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sis, focusing only on those firms influenced solely by Canadian standards 
and regulations.59 
Table 8 provides the results of this more stringent test, again ex-
amining both the full and the reduced indices.  Our findings are very sim-
ilar to Table 5.  For instance, the year of observation is again seen to be 
an important determinant of monitoring mechanisms and, for the full in-
dex, investment opportunity and the need for external finance retain their 
significantly positive relation to monitoring.  Interestingly, firm size is no 
longer an important influence on monitoring.  However, this result may 
not be surprising after noting that only the largest Canadian firms choose 
to cross-list in the United States, and the median size of cross-listed firms 
in the sample is over 1.5 times that of the median size of non-cross-listed 
firms. 
Turning to the role of independent boards of non-cross-listed firms, 
we document findings similar to those of the sample as a whole.  Again, 
independent boards positively influence the value of the full index, in-
cluding committee memberships.  This is an impressive finding because 
firms listed solely in Canada have not faced the same impending re-
quirement to alter the composition of these committees.  In a purely vo-
luntary environment, it appears that independent boards are exerting sig-
nificant influence on the composition of committee memberships.  The 
findings here also confirm that board independence has no influence on 
the reduced index when committees are excluded from the analysis. 
The second subsample analyzed in Table 8 includes only firms 
without a majority voter.  The motivation behind this subsample comes 
from the observation that majority voters occur in a non-trivial portion of 
the sample (28.17%), and Table 5 documents that the presence of a ma-
jority voter is negatively associated with the level of the full index but 
not with the level of the reduced index.  Table 6, in which the majority 
voter variable is significantly and negatively associated with the forma-
tion of independent committees, gives further support for the influence of 
a controlling shareholder.  Although independent boards advocate inde-
                                                            
 59. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act adds an additional potential complication to the analysis: no 
standardized format for disclosure exists for firms to reveal whether they have voluntarily underta-
ken to adopt the measures implied by the Act.  As a result, it is possible that some firms have chosen 
to adopt these measures without disclosing that they have done so.  To the extent that this occurs, our 
analysis is based on disclosed governance adoption rather than on the true, potentially unobservable 
adoption rates.  This is not an issue for the mechanisms recommended by the Dey Report, for which 
consistent disclosure standards existed throughout the sample period.  The main findings are sup-
ported by the individual analysis of these mechanisms in Table 6, where it can be seen that indepen-
dent boards primarily exert influence on the adoption of monitoring mechanisms through committee 
memberships and have limited impact on other mechanisms.  This conclusion holds even when 
confining the analysis to include only mechanisms with standardized disclosure. 
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pendent audit and compensation committees, controlling shareholders 
appear opposed to their formation. 
The findings change within this subsample, which implies an inter-
esting dynamic between the board of directors and controlling sharehold-
ers.  While the control variables behave as in previous results, the role of 
an independent board strengthens when a majority voter is not present.  
In this subsample, independent boards are again associated with higher 
adoption rates for the full index; however, they are also able to exert a 
positive influence on the reduced index, in which only those mechanisms 
not pertaining to committee membership are included.  The results are 
therefore sensitive to the presence of a majority voter.  When a majority 
voter is not present, independent boards are more likely to voluntarily 
adopt a wide range of monitoring mechanisms.  When a controlling 
shareholder is present, however, the board has a reduced ability to adopt 
these mechanisms and appears to focus its efforts on ensuring that com-
mittee membership includes only independent directors—a mechanism 
to which controlling shareholders are particularly opposed. 
V.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Using hand-collected data from over 1200 proxy circulars for Ca-
nadian firms, this study has examined the hypothesis that independent 
boards are more inclined than non-independent boards to voluntarily 
adopt mechanisms designed to enhance their ability to monitor firm 
management.  Independent boards have been defined as those with either 
a majority of independent directors, where the term “independent” is tak-
en to mean both independent and unrelated, or an independent chair.  The 
observations suggest that in almost all cases, the presence of an indepen-
dent chair coincides with a majority of independent directors. 
Relying on the ordered probit methodology, the primary results 
suggest that independent boards place special importance on maintaining 
board committees staffed exclusively with independent directors and that 
their ability to voluntarily adopt other monitoring mechanisms is sensi-
tive to the presence of a controlling shareholder.  When a controlling 
shareholder is not present, independent boards are able to adopt addition-
al monitoring mechanisms of all types. 
These conclusions are robust to controlling for the shareholding 
characteristics of the firm, its need for funds, and the tangibility of its 
assets.  In general, the year of the observation, the firm size, and whether 
the company has shares listed on a U.S. stock exchange play a large role 
in establishing the propensity of a firm to adopt monitoring mechanisms, 
with more recent observations, large firms, and those with U.S. cross-
listings scoring higher on both indices of adoption.  Formal tests of mul-
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ticollinearity, alternative model specifications, and a more stringent test 
of the hypothesis in the context of only non-cross-listed firms do not 
change the results. 
The theoretical motivation underlying the study is agency theory 
and the traditional view of the role of the board of directors.  Traditional-
ly, the board of directors actively monitors decision-makers who have a 
tendency to divert firm resources to their own best interests.  The results 
support this view and provide evidence that a non-trivial number of rec-
ommended monitoring mechanisms have been adopted by firms and that 
the adoption rate is increasing for firms with both independent and non-
independent boards.  Nevertheless, a potential limitation of the study is 
that it does not incorporate alterative views for the board of directors, 
such as influencing managerial decisions through an advisory role.  In 
addition, it ignores processes other than board monitoring that may serve 
to reduce agency costs.60  Finally, it confines its consideration of moni-
toring mechanisms to those formally suggested either by Canadian 
guidelines or by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, placing equal weight on each 
of the chosen mechanisms despite the fact that some may be more effec-
tive than others. 
Despite these limitations, the study makes several valuable contri-
butions.  First, it provides evidence on the effectiveness of non-
mandatory governance guidelines.  Despite the fact that there is no re-
quirement for firms to adopt the recommended guidelines, the evidence 
shows that a number of firms do.61  Second, the study provides insights 
into board behavior and the processes boards follow rather than focusing 
on the inconclusive role of the board in influencing firm performance.  
Although previous literature on boards and performance has been exten-
sive, it has provided few concrete insights.  This study takes an alterna-
tive approach by shedding light on board dynamics and the influence that 
boards have on governance mechanisms, which may in turn influence 
performance.  In doing so, the study provides several possible explana-
tions for the inconclusive findings relating performance to board inde-
pendence, and it therefore points to future avenues for academic re-
search.  For instance, there appears to be little difference in the adoption 
rate across boards of either type for several monitoring mechanisms.  
This suggests that a possible explanation for a lack of difference in per-
                                                            
 60. See Kenneth Rediker & Anju Seth, Boards of Directors and Substitution Effects of Alterna-
tive Governance Mechanisms, 16 STRAT. MGMT. J. 85, 97–98 (1995). 
 61. While this result is clear in the Canadian context, one should exercise caution in extending 
these findings to developing economies.  See Maria Krambia–Kapardis & Jim Psaros, The Imple-
mentation of Corporate Governance Principles in an Emerging Economy: A Critique of the Situa-
tion in Cyprus, 14 CORP. GOV.: INT’L. REV. 126 (2006). 
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formance is that both kinds of boards are behaving similarly with respect 
to their actions: there is no difference because behavior is the same. 
Alternatively, in cases where there is evidence that independent 
boards do behave differently, such as the adoption of an independent au-
dit committee, finding no difference in performance may suggest that 
this particular monitoring mechanism contributes little to the firm’s ulti-
mate performance.  This could be the case if the mechanism is so exces-
sively costly to implement that any gain from enhanced monitoring is 
eliminated by this expense.  This expense may be monetary in nature, but 
it may also be a reduction in the board’s effectiveness as advisors; for 
example, a board’s effectiveness may be reduced if management is un-
willing to provide sensitive information to a board with tendencies to-
ward overzealous monitoring.62 
In addition to these academic contributions and suggestions for fu-
ture research, the study has significant implications for policymakers 
advocating for independent boards.  Perhaps most important is that the 
presence of an independent board does not guarantee enhanced com-
pliance with all recommended practices.  Board independence appears to 
have a very specific influence on the types of practices adopted, primari-
ly those related to committee membership, and its influence may be 
dampened by the presence of a controlling shareholder.  These results 
help to address our gap in understanding “the conditions under which 
regulation of boards will lead to improvements” identified by Hermalin 
and Weisbach,63 and these results also force regulators to make explicit 
what they hope to achieve by recommending or mandating independent 
boards. 
   
                                                            
 62. Adams & Ferreira, supra note 12, at 218. 
 63. Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Deter-
mined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 7–26 (2003). 
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